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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION, 
Petitioner-Defendant, 
Case No. 890189-CA 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and (Case Priority No. 6) 
ALLEN G. WHITE, 
Respondent-Applicant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPLICANT ALLEN G. WHITE 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-86 (Supp. 1988). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Was the Industrial Commission's decision arbitrary and 
capricious that Alan White was an employee of Jess Aylett 
Construction? 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Benefits were awarded to Allen G. White by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. Petitioner Jess Aylett Construction filed a 
Petition for Writ of Review to this Court on or about March 30, 
1989. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Procedurally, the case is controlled by Utah Code 
Annotated, §35-1-84 (Addendum 1) and §35-1-85 (Addendum 2) as 
they existed as of the filing of the case (December 2, 1986). 
Substantively, the case is governed by Utah Code Annotated §35-
1-42(2) (as it read in March, 1986) (See attached Addendum 3) 
and the Utah Supreme Court case, Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) (See Addendum 4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case; 
Allen G. White (Allen White) claimed that he was an 
employee of Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall (Aylett) for 
purposes of receiving an award of workers compensation benefits. 
Benefits were awarded by the Administrative Law Judge and 
affirmed by the Industrial Commission. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below: 
1. Allen White was injured on March 17, 1986. (R. 2) 
2. On December 23, 1986, Allen White filed an Application 
for Hearing because Defendants had denied responsibility for 
medical treatment, payment of temporary total disability 
compensation and permanent partial disability compensation. (R. 
4) 
3. Aylett responded to the Application for Hearing denying 
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that he was responsible for the injuries sustained by Allen 
White. (R. 3-6) 
4. A hearing was held on April 9, 1987, before Richard G. 
Sumsion, the Administrative Law Judge. Evidence was presented 
by Allen White, Steve White and Aylett. (R. 34-175) 
5. Following the hearing Defendant Aylett was given 
through April 15 to arrange an independent medical examination 
with another doctor. (R. 205) 
6. The parties were also allowed to provide additional 
documentary evidence to the Judge. The matter was then taken 
under advisement. (R. 206) 
7. On September 9, 1987, the Administrative Law Judge 
prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
determining that Allen White was an employee of Jess Aylett dba 
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall at the time of his injury. 
(R. 285-292) (Addendum 5) 
8. On September 15, 1987, a copy of the independent 
medical examination performed at the request of Defendant Aylett 
was submitted to the Administrative Law Judge. (R. 293-298) 
9. Jess Aylett, individually, pro se, filed a Motion for 
Review on September 24, 1987. (R. 299-300) Aylett's counsel 
filed a Motion for Review concerning both the appropriate 
impairment rating and the employment relationship between the 
parties on October 8, 1987. (R. 304-329) 
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10. The Administrative Law Judge then entered 
"Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" 
modifying the portions of his original Order dealing with the 
impairment rating and the appropriate amount of compensation to 
be paid. No modifications were made concernincj the original 
Findings of Fact that Aylett was the employer of Allen White for 
workers compensation purposes and as such was responsible for 
payment of benefits to White.. (R. 330-334) . 
11. Another Motion for Review was filed by Aylett7s 
counsel which concerned only the impairment rating. The matter 
was then referred by the Administrative Law Judge to an 
independent medical examiner. (R. 340-341). The examiner's 
report was furnished to the parties (R. 342-345). 
12. The Administrative Law Judge then issued an Amended 
Supplemental Order which made no changes from his prior Order. 
(R. 348-350). 
13. A Motion for Review of that Order was filed by Jess 
Aylett, pro se. (R. 351). 
14. The Industrial Commission considered the case and 
adopted the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact 
concerning the employment relationship between Allen White and 
Aylett. The Commission found Aylett liable for White's workers 
compensation benefits. (R. 355-357). (Addendum 6) 
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15. Aylett filed the pending Petition for Writ of Review 
from the Commission's Order. (R. 359) 
C. Statement of Facts; 
1. Jess Aylett, doing business as Jess Aylett Construction 
and Drywall began working as a drywall contractor in 1985 (R. at 
165) . 
2. In late January, 1986, Allen White and his brother 
Steve White began working for Aylett. (R.49) While working for 
Aylett, Allen and Steve White worked as a team and split their 
wages 50/50. (R. 49) 
3. Aylett did not have any discussion with either Allen or 
Steve White regarding workers compensation or other insurance, 
nor did Aylett tell them he would not assume responsibility for 
any accident. Aylett probably stated he would not withhold 
taxes (R. 167). 
4. In testimony at the Industrial Commission, Aylett 
claimed to have no "employees" but from January to March of 1986 
had at least four people doing hanging, taping and finishing for 
him as "subcontractors." (R. 165). 
5. Aylett told Allen and Steve White where to work, (R. 
52,64,75,132,193) gave them a completion date and furnished 
tape, mud, corner bead, nails and scaffolding when they needed 
it. (R. 60,87,132). Allen and Steve White furnished their own 
hand tools and some taping equipment. (R. 60,132) 
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6. Aylett was at the job site every day or every other 
day. He checked on their performance and completion and told 
them where to go when that house was done. (R. 75,132) 
7. Allen and Steve were paid on a "per foot" rate. Aylett 
calculated the number of feet completed and paid them 
accordingly. (R. 70) They worked approximately eight hours per 
day and often Saturday and Sunday for Aylett (R. 148) 
8. The first four checks were made out to Allen White 
individually. The next check was made out to Steve White. (R. 
181-184). 
9. On March 17, 1986, (the day of the injury) Aylett 
called Allen White at home at approximately 6:00 a.m. and wanted 
them to tape a garage for another "taper" who did not show up. 
Aylett wanted them to be at work at 8:00 a.m. (R. 53) 
10. Allen White was injured when the stilts on which he 
was standing to tape the 10 foot garage ceiling collapsed. 
(R. 54 ) . 
11. He sustained a severe fracture with dislocation at his 
left elbow. The injury required surgery. Allen White missed 
fourteen and half weeks of work. (R. 54, 285-292) He also 
sustained a permanent impairment of 31% of the left upper 
extremity. (R. 330-335) (Addendum 5) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The findings of the Industrial Commission are supported by 
substantial evidence. Jess Aylett dba Jess Aylett Construction 
and Drywall had the right to control Allen White7s work and 
exercised that right. He told White when to work, gave him a 
time table for completion of the work, furnished materials and 
some equipment, inspected the job site and calculated the amount 
he was to be paid based on the amount completed on a weekly 
basis. 
The Administrative Law Judge, heard evidence presented by 
the injured worker, Allen White, his brother, Steve White, a co-
worker and Aylett. The Judge concluded that because the work 
done by White was "part or process" of the business of Aylett, 
and involved the same trade or business of Aylett Construction 
and Drywall (emphasis added), White was an employee within the 
meaning of §35-1-42(2) Utah Code Ann. and when injured was 
entitled to workers compensation benefits. 
Appellant attempts, in his brief, to shift responsibility 
for benefits owed to White to the alleged general contractor on 
the job, George Hobbs Construction. Hobbs was not a party to 
the preceding below and it is improper to attempt to adjudicate 
his rights herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS FINDINGS MUST BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The Application for Hearing in the matter was filed on 
September 24, 1986. As this was prior to the effective date of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (See section 63-46b-22(2) 
(1989) the matter is controlled by the law in effect at the time 
of the filing. Section 35-1-84 (1974) (repealed 1987, repeal 
effective January 1, 1988) provides, in part: 
"Upon such review the Court may affirm or 
set aside such awards, but only upon the 
following grounds: (1) that the commission 
acted without or in excess of its powers; 
(2) that the Findings of Fact do not support 
the award." 
Section 35-1-84 should be read together with §35-1-85 (1974) 
(repealed 1987, effective January 1, 1988) which states: 
"The Findings and Conclusions of the 
Commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be 
subject to review; such questions of fact 
shall include ultimate facts and the 
Findings and Conclusions of the 
Commission...." 
The Commission's Findings of Fact are awarded great 
deference and the Findings are not to be disturbed unless they 
are "arbitrary and capricious." Utah Department of 
Administrative Servs. vs. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 
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601 (Utah 1983). "The Commission's Findings of Fact should be 
sustained if there is evidence of any substance whatsoever which 
can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination 
made." Kennecott Corporation Employees vs. Department of 
Employment Security. 13 Ut. 2d 362, 372 P.2d 987, 989 (1962). 
The Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Commissions 
decision that Allen White was an employee of Aylett should be 
affirmed. 
Further support for the decision is the long standing 
principal that the Workers Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed and doubts as to compensation should be resolved in 
favor of the Applicant. McPhie vs. Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977) and State Tax Commission vs. Industrial 
Commission. 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). 
Applying these standards, since there is substantial 
evidence in the record that Aylett exercised control over the 
work of Allen Whitef and they were involved in the same trade or 
business, the benefits awarded to White should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION AND DRYWALL WAS AN 
EMPLOYER OF ALLEN G. WHITE FOR WORKERS 
COMPENSATION PURPOSES • 
Jess Aylett dba Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall 
contracted with various parties to install and finish drywall on 
projects. From January to the time Allen White was injured 
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Aylett had no less than four different persons performing 
drywall installation and finishing at his request and on these 
projects, (R. 165) Aylett considered these drywall installers 
subcontractors. However, they were "part or process" of his 
business. Section 35-1-42(2) provides: 
"...where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, such contractor...shall be 
deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
employees of such original employer." (1985) 
(Addendum 1) 
That section has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to 
hold that work is "part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer" if it relates to the successful performance of the 
enterprise of the employer. Bennett v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). Aylett Construction and Drywall 
(emphasis added) was in the business of installing and finishing 
drywall. That was the integral part of Aylett's business and 
without employees such as Allen White, the business would not 
have continued. 
Bennett. supra, extensively quoted by Aylett, concerns 
essentially two different employment relationships. The first 
is the relationship between Bennett (the injured worker) and 
Johnson Brothers (a subcontractor) . The s€»cond is the 
relationship between Bennett and C. L. Mathews Construction (the 
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general contractor). In deciding that Bennett was an employee 
of Johnson Brothers, the Court held that if an "employer" has 
the right to control the work of the injured worker, the worker 
is an employee for workers compensation purposes." Bennett, 
supra at 429-430. 
Numerous examples of the control exercised by Aylett are 
contained in the record: he told White where to work each day; 
gave him completion date or time for each home; and furnished 
such equipment as tape, mud, bead and scaffolding. Aylett also 
calculated the amount of work which had been completed each week 
and White was paid based on Aylett's calculations. On the day 
of the accident, White was even asked to be at work at a certain 
time. (R. 53) Such control is sufficient to evidence the 
employment relationship. 
POINT III 
THE ATTEMPT TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY TO HOBBS IS IMPROPER. 
Aylett's brief does not argue that Aylett is not 
responsible. The principle focus is that Hobbs Construction 
should be required to provide benefits. Hobbs Construction was 
never made a party to these proceedings. At the time of the 
hearing in this case, Aylett testified that the general 
contractor on the job was George Hobbs or George Hobbs Homes. 
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(R. 197) Hobbs was not joined by Defendant. Applicant also did 
not seek to have Hobbs made a party as he was also uninsured.1 
Aylett cannot escape liability by attempting to shift 
responsibility to George Hobbs Construction. As the Court 
determined in Bennett, supra, responsibility of the employer, 
such as Aylett, and the statutory employer, such as Hobbs, are 
concurrent. A finding that George Hobbs or another entity was 
the general contractor in this particular job would not relieve 
Aylett of liability. 
Aylett's attempt to pass responsibility on to George Hobbs 
Construction is inappropriate. That is especially the case when 
Hobbs is also uninsured. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Commission 
correctly concluded that Allen White was an employee of Jess 
Aylett Construction and Drywall for workers compensation 
purposes. At the time of White's injury, he was performing work 
for and at the request of Aylett. Aylett had the right to and 
was exercising control over the work and the work was a "part or 
process" of the business of Aylett. 
The decision awarding benefits is supported by the evidence 
1
 At the time of the hearing, White's attorney checked 
with the policy department of the Industrial Commission. No 
policy was in effect for George Hobbs or George Hobbs Homes. 
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in the case and is not arbitrary and capricious, 
foregoing reasons, it should be affirmed. 
For the 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ 
H 
day of October, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Industrial Commission of Utah 
150 East 300 South 
P. 0. Box 510250 
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DATED AND SIGNED this day of October, 1989. 
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upon the record of the commission as certified by it. Upon such 
review the court may affirm or set aside such award, but only 
upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its 
powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the award. 
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Utah Code Annotated §35-1-85 (1965) (repealed effective January 
1, 1988) 
DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - FILING - CONCLUSIVENESS 
ON QUESTIONS OF FACT - REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT 
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the 
commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
writing and file the same with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusion of the commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such 
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings 
and conclusion of the commission. The commission and every 
party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall 
have the right to appear in the review proceedings. Upon the 
hearing the court shall enter judgment either affirming or 
setting aside the award. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42(2) (1985) 
EMPLOYERS ENUMERATED AND DEFINED - REGULARLY 
EMPLOYED - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 
Every person, firm and private corporationf including every 
public utility, having in service on or more workmen or 
operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written, except agricultural 
employers who meet any one of the following conditions: (a) 
whose employees are all members of the immediate family of the 
employer, which employer has a proprietary interest in the farm; 
provided that the inclusion of any immediate family member under 
the provisions of this title is at the option of the employer or 
(b) who employ five or fewer persons other than immediate family 
members for 40 hours or more per week per each employee for 13 
consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months; 
and except domestic employers who do not employ one employee or 
more than one employee at least 40 hours per week; provided, 
that employers of agriculture laborers and domestic servants, 
shall have the right to come under the terms of this title by 
complying with the provisions thereof and the rules and 
regulations of the commission. 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all 
employments in the usual course of the trade, business, 
profession or occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or 
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in 
the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and 
all persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be 
deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such 
original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be 
deemed an employer within the meaning of this section. The term 
"independent contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any 
person, association or corporation engaged in the performance of 
any work for another, who while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, 
is not subject to the rule of control of the employer, is 
engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
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BENNETT v. INDUST 
Cite as 726 P 4^ 
dissenting); see also Moody v. Moody, 715 
P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in result) (very high standard 
for reopening custodial orders); Hirsch v. 
Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1986) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) 
(custody changes governed by strict stan-
dards, different from those applicable to 
initial custody awards). To state the appli-
cable standard carelessly is to invite confu-
sion in an area in which courts have excep-
tional powers over the lives of children of 
divorced parents, an area where the eradi-
cation of such confusion should be an im-
portant goal. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 
at 1322 (Zimmerman, J., concurring sepa-
rately). 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
Robert N. BENNETT, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Johnson Brothers Construction and 
C.L. Matthews Construction, Defend-
ants. 
No. 20705. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 30, 1986. 
Injured worker sought reversal of In-
dustrial Commission order which denied 
him worker's compensation benefits. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that (1) 
Commission erred, as matter of law, in 
holding that injured worker was not em-
ployee of construction contractors, and (2) 
subcontractor's employee is deemed em-
ployee of general contractor if general con-
tractor retains some supervision or control 
over subcontractor's work and work done 
AL COM^ OF UTAH Utah 427 
n (Utah 1986) 
by subcontractor is "part of process in 
trade or business of the employer." 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., concurred in result 
1. Workers' Compensation <3»1935 
In reviewing Industrial Commission or-
ders, Supreme Court defers to Commis-
sion's findings of fact unless it makes find-
ings not supported by substantial evidence; 
Court does not defer to Commission when 
construing statutory terms or when apply-
ing statutory terms to facts unless con-
struction of statutory language or applica-
tion of law to facts should be subject to 
Commission's expertise gleaned from its 
accumulated practical, firsthand experience 
with subject matter. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3»1935 
Whether worker is employee within 
meaning of workmen's compensation law 
requires application of statutory standard 
to facts, and resolution of issues which are 
not benefited by Commission's expertise or 
experience; thus, court does not defer to 
Commission's ruling in such instances. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>1939.11(3) 
Since evidence in workmen's compen-
sation case was essentially uncontradicted, 
court needed only to determine whether, as 
matter of law, Industrial Commission erred 
in ruling that injured worker was not an 
employee of contractor. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>235 
If evidence shows that "employer" re-
tains right to control work of claimant, 
claimant is usually considered an "employ-
ee" for workmen's compensation purposes. 
5. Workers' Compensation <s=>235 
Concept of right to control in work-
men's compensation cases should not be 
rigidly and narrowly defined; rather, it is 
proper to resolve doubt as to whether 
worker was employee in favor of employee. 
6. Workers' Compensation <s=>235 
Factors included in determining wheth-
er employer has right to control employee's 
ADDENDUM 4-1 
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work includes actual supervision of worker, 
extent of supervision, method of payment, 
furnishing of equipment for worker, and 
right to terminate worker's employment. 
7. Workers' Compensation <3»235 
Industrial Commission erred, as matter 
of law, in holding that injured worker was 
not employee of construction contractor 
where contractor retained and exercised 
right to control worker's job conduct, con-
tractor hired coemployees, and worker per-
formed same job as he had previously per-
formed during prior employment with con-
tractor. 
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>351 
Under statute, subcontractor's employ-
ee is deemed employee of general contrac-
tor if general contractor retains some su-
pervision or control over subcontractor's 
work and work done by subcontractor is 
part or process in trade or business of 
employer. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-42(2). 
9. Workers' Compensation <&»351 
Term "supervision or control" in work-
men's compensation statute requires only 
that general contractor retain ultimate con-
trol over project in order to retain "supervi-
sion or control" so as to make general 
contractor a "statutory employer." U.C.A. 
1953, 3&-l-42(2). 
10. Workers' Compensation <3»355 
As long as subcontractor's work is 
part or process of general contractor's 
business, an inference arises that general 
contractor has retained supervision or con-
trol over subcontractor sufficient to meet 
requirement of worker's compensation stat-
ute. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-42(2). 
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for plaintiff. 
Carvel R. Shaffer, Bountiful, Erik M. 
Ward, Ogden, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Robert N. Bennett seeks rever-
sal of an Industrial Commission order 
1. The former employee is referred to in the 
transcript as "Don CrummiL" His affidavit, 
which denied him workers' compensation 
benefits. At issue is whether Bennett was 
an employee of Johnson Brothers Construc-
tion and a "statutory employee" of C.L. 
Matthews Construction Co. We reverse 
the Commission's order. 
The facts are as follows: Bennett, a 
trained cement finisher, was regularly em-
ployed by Johnson Brothers Construction 
from May, 1983, until November, 1983, 
when he was terminated due to a reduction 
in work force. After termination, Bennett 
collected unemployment benefits. During 
his unemployment, he established a check-
ing account in the name of Bob Bennett 
Construction and informed Johnson Broth-
ers that he intended to obtain a contrac-
tor's license, although he never did. Dur-
ing December, 1983, Bennett performed 
several small jobs for Johnson Brothers. 
On each job, he was paid cash in a lump 
sum without any deductions from the pay-
ments. 
In February, 1984, C.L. Matthews Con-
struction contracted to do remodeling 
work, including replacing the concrete 
driveway, at the Kimball Condominium in 
Salt Lake City. Matthews let a subcon-
tract to Johnson Brothers to remove and 
replace the driveway. Johnson Brothers 
and Matthews agreed that payment for the 
job would be approximately $400 and that 
Matthews would furnish the concrete and 
rental equipment, including a jackhammer 
and a compressor, for the project. Mat-
thews testified that he "went through all 
the details with Chris [Johnson], and then 
left the job for him to complete." Johnson 
Brothers then contacted Bennett and an-
other former employee, Don Russell,1 and, 
as the Commission stated, "asked them if 
they would like to do the job for a set 
sum." The job would take about two days. 
Bennett and Russell agreed. 
On the first day,, they removed all the 
concrete and completed the subgrading. 
On the second day, according to the Com-
mission, "Johnson Brothers appeared at the 
site twice to see how the work was coming 
however, is signed "Don Russell." We refer to 
him as Don Russell. 
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along and to check the specifications." 
During that day, Russell struck a nail 
which flipped into Bennett's eye. The inju-
ry resulted in surgery and the possibility 
that Bennett may need a lens transplant to 
fully regain his vision. 
After Bennett was injured, one of the 
Johnsons stepped in to help Russell com-
plete the job. Johnson Brothers tendered 
Bennett a check for $150 made payable to 
"Bob Bennett Construction" for his work 
on the job. Bennett refused to cash the 
check and returned it to Johnson Brothers 
with a note stating that he did not have a 
contractor's license. He requested that 
Johnson Brothers reissue the check pay-
able to him personally. 
The Commission held that Bennett was 
not entitled to workers' compensation bene-
fits because he was an independent con-
tractor. Its ruling was based on the find-
ings that Bennett had intended to become 
an independent contractor, had established 
a bank account for a contracting business, 
and had been paid in a lump sum with no 
deductions. The Commission also found 
that Johnson Brothers "did not exercise a 
demonstrable amount of control over the 
work project. They only made two inspec-
tion visits to the site to determine if the 
specifications were being met." Because 
the Commission ruled that Bennett was not 
an employee of Johnson Brothers, it did not 
address the nature of the legal relationship 
between Matthews and Johnson Brothers. 
I. 
[1] In reviewing Industrial Commission 
orders, we defer to the Commission's find-
ings of fact unless it makes findings not 
supported by substantial evidence. Pinter 
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 
307 (Utah 1984). We do not defer to the 
Commission when construing statutory 
terms or when applying statutory terms to 
the facts unless the construction of the 
statutory language or the application of the 
law to the facts should be subject to the 
Commission's expertise gleaned from its 
accumulated practical, first-hand experi-
ence with the subject matter. See general-
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ly, Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 
658 P.2d 601, 611 (Utah 1983). 
[2,3] Whether a worker is an employee 
within the meaning of the workmen's com-
pensation laws requires the application of a 
statutory standard to the facts. Since res-
olution of the issue is not benefitted by 
Commission expertise or experience, we do 
not defer to the Commission's ruling. 
Board of Education v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 
51 (Utah 1984). See also Christean v. In-
dustrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 455, 
196 P.2d 502, 504 (1948); Stover Bedding 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 
423, 424-25, 107 P.2d 1027, 1027 (1940). 
Since the evidence is essentially uncontra-
dicted, we need to determine only whether, 
as a matter of law, the Commission erred 
in ruling that Bennett was not an employ-
ee. See Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Com-
mission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977); 
Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 
113 Utah 504, 506, 196 P.2d 718, 719 (1948); 
Intermountain Speedways, Inc., v. Indus-
trial Commission, 101 Utah 573, 577-78, 
126 P.2d 22, 24 (1942); Stover Bedding Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah at 425, 
107 P.2d at 1028; Strieker v. Industrial 
Commission, 55 Utah 603, 607-08, 188 P. 
849, 851 (1920). 
II. 
[4,5] On the merits, we first address 
the issue of whether the Commission erred 
in ruling that Bennett was not an employee 
of Johnson Brothers. Section 35-l-43(l)(b) 
defines "employee" as every person "in the 
service o f an employer as defined in 
§ 35-1-42(2). What constitutes being "in 
the service o f has often been determined 
by reference to common law master-serv-
ant principles, although in Rustler Lodge, 
we indicated a broadening of the term pur-
suant to Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 220. Rustler Lodge, 562 P.2d at 228. 
However, it will almost always follow that 
if the evidence shows that an "employer" 
retains the right to control the work of the 
claimant, the claimant is the employer's 
employee for workmen's compensation pur-
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poses. E.g., Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
P.2d 1286,1291 (Utah 1976); Auerbach Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 
195 P.2d 245 (1948). Certainly, the concept 
of right to control is not to be rigidly and 
narrowly defined.2 Rather, it should be 
defined to give full effect to the remedial 
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. See Hinds Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 20 Utah 2d 322, 437 P.2d 451 
(1968), which held that it was. proper to 
resolve doubt as to whether a worker was an 
employee in favor of the employee. 
[6] Many factors have been applied in 
determining the right to control. Among 
those factors are actual supervision of the 
worker, the extent of the supervision, the 
method of payment, the furnishing of 
equipment for the worker, and the right to 
terminate the worker. Harry L. Young & 
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318 
(Utah 1975). Although these factors are 
not inclusive, they are relevant in many 
cases, including this case. 
[7] The uncontested evidence indicates 
that Johnson Brothers retained and exer-
cised the right to control Bennett's job con-
duct. Johnson Brothers dealt with Bennett 
as an employee. Bennett was simply told 
how much he would be paid. During the two 
days Bennett was on the job, someone from 
Johnson Brothers appeared twice to over-
see Bennett's performance. When Ben-
2. Professor Larson strongly suggests that right 
of control is an inappropriate test for determin-
ing employee status for workers' compensation 
purposes. 1C A Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, § 43.42 (1986). The control test was 
borrowed from agency law. The purpose of 
agency law, to define the limits of a master's 
vicarious liability for a servant's misdeeds, is 
entirely different from the remedial purpose of 
the workmen's compensation acts, which is to 
spread the burden of industrial accidents 
across the population. Id; see Pinter Construc-
tion Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 1985); 
Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 
Utah 423, 429-31, 107 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (1940) 
(Wolfe, J., dissenting). Therefore, Larson sug-
gests, more emphasis should be placed on the 
nature of the work performed. Larson, supra, 
nett was injured, Johnson Brothers provided 
the labor to fill in for Bennett. They hired 
both Bennett and Don Russell to do the job. It 
was not Bennett who hired Russell, as 
would have been the case if Bennett were 
an independent contractor. Bennett was 
hired to do a short, one-time project Thus, 
although Bennett wais paid in a lump sum, 
rather than by the hour, the pay tendered 
was reduced, apparently because of his 
time off the job due to the accident Even 
though he had no deductions withheld from 
his pay, that is of no significance since the 
amount paid was so small and the job of 
such short duration. 
Although Bennett had been an employee 
of Johnson Brothers and although he had 
been terminated because of a reduction in 
work force, his recall for a short time was 
consistent with the manner in which he had 
performed during his previous tenure with 
Johnson Brothers. He performed exactly 
the same type of work he had performed 
while officially on Johnson Brothers' pay-
roll. Finally, it was Matthews who fur-
nished both the concrete and the heavy 
equipment that Bennett and Russell used 
on the job.3 Nothing in Bennett's relation-
ship to Johnson changed, except for John-
son Brothers' not withholding payroll de-
ductions from the amounts paid Bennett 
On somewhat similar facts, a claimant in 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 
1020 (1961), was held to be an employee. 
§ 43.50. If a worker is integrally or continu-
ously involved in an employer's business, and 
the worker's own operations are not such that 
they could readily channel the costs of an indus-
trial accident to the general population, the 
worker should be considered an employee for 
workmen's compensation purposes. Id. 
3. Professor Larson states that the furnishing of 
valuable equipment to a worker indicates an 
employer-employee relationship. The furnish-
ing-of-valuable-equipment rule should only ap-
ply to valuable equipment. An employer would 
have a much greater interest in controlling the 
actions of a worker using the employer's $10,-
000 truck than in controlling a worker using the 
employer's $5 hammer. Larson, supra, § 44.34. 
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There, the worker was hired to furnish and 
operate a drilling rig for one specific drill-
ing project. He was not listed as an em-
ployee on the employer's books, nor were 
deductions withheld from his pay. How-
ever, he was paid by the shift and a super-
visor was present most of the time he 
worked. 
Bennett's intention to become an inde-
pendent contractor at some indefinite time 
in the future was irrelevant Although he 
had opened a bank account in the name of 
"Bob Bennett Construction," and had ap-
parently obtained the papers to apply for a 
contractor's license, he never actually filed 
them. What Bennett might have intended 
to do later was not indicative of his status 
at the time of the accident. 
In sum, we hold that the Commission 
erred, as a matter of law, in holding that 
Bennett was not an employee of Johnson 
Brothers. 
III. 
Bennett also alleged that Matthews was 
liable for his workers' compensation cover-
age pursuant to the "statutory employer" 
portion of § 35-1-42(2), which states: 
Where any employer procures any 
work to be done wholly or in part for him 
by a contractor over whose work he re-
tains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, such contrac-
tor, all persons employed by him, all sub-
contractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontrac-
tors, are considered employees of the 
original employer. 
According to Professor Larson, statutes 
of this kind were passed "to protect em-
ployees of irresponsible and uninsured sub-
contractors by imposing ultimate liability 
on the presumably responsible principal 
contractor, who has it within his power, in 
choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their 
responsibility and insist upon appropriate 
compensation protection for their work-
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ers." Larson, supra, § 49.14. A second-
ary purpose of these statutes was "to fore-
stall evasion of [workmen's compensation 
acts] by those who might be tempted to 
subdivide their regular operations among 
subcontractors, thus escaping direct em-
ployment relations with the workers . . . " 
Id. § 49.15. 
[8] Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontrac-
tor's employee is deemed an employee of 
the general contractor if (1) the general 
contractor retains some supervision or con-
trol over the subcontractor's work, and (2) 
the work done by the subcontractor is a 
"part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer." E.g., Pinter Construction 
Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984); 
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 
562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young & 
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318 
(1975). 
A subcontractor's work is "part or pro-
cess in the trade or business of the employ-
er," if it is part of the operations which 
directly relate to the successful perform-
ance of the general contractor's commercial 
enterprise. Pinter Construction Co. v. 
Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron 
Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Utah 1977); 
King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30 
A.2d 549, 552 (1943). The trade or busi-
ness of a general contractor in the con-
struction business is construction, Smith v. 
Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 158, 
493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972); Adamson v. Ok-
land Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 
289, 508 P.2d 805, 807 (1973); Annot, 150 
A.L.R. 1214,1223 (1944), and any portion of 
the general contractor's construction 
project which is subcontracted out will ordi-
narily be considered "part or process in the 
trade or business o f the general contrac-
tor. 
[9] The requirement in § 35-1-42(2) 
that the general contractor, as a "statutory 
employer," retain "supervision or control" 
over the work of the subcontractor who 
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by 
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definition, be equated with the common law 
standard for determining whether a person 
is an employee or an independent contrac-
tor. In dealing with "statutory" employ-
ees, the statute begins with the proposition 
that the claimant qualifies as an employee 
of the subcontractor. But the statutory 
requirement that the general contractor 
have "supervision or control" over the 
work of the subcontractor cannot mean 
that the subcontractor must also qualify as 
an employee of the general contractor. 
That would be at least highly improbable 
and perhaps impossible by definition. 
Rather, the term "supervision or control" 
requires only that the general contractor 
retain ultimate control over the project. 
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 
P.2d at 309. As stated in Nochta v. Indus-
trial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 166, 436 
P.2d 944 (1968), 
The evidence is clear in the instant case 
that the respondent construction compa-
ny exercised that degree of control over 
the job to be performed by the petitioner 
sufficient to bring petitioner within the 
meaning of § 23-902, subsec. B. They 
provided the material that he was to use; 
the job superintendent together with the 
architect made inspections of the job and 
there were consultations; but the final 
and exclusive control of the job was vest-
ed in the job superintendent The fact 
that petitioner was knowledgeable and 
trusted in his field does not lessen the 
ultimate control over the job by the job 
superintendent 
Id. at 16&-70, 436 P.2d at 947-48. In 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 
155, 493 P.2d 994, this Court found that the 
general contractor held on a major con-
struction project at Brigham Young Uni-
versity, by virtue of its ultimate supervi-
sory control over the entire project, had 
sufficient control over the masonry subcon-
tractor on the project to warrant holding 
the general contractor to be the statutory 
employer of one of the masonry subcon-
tractor's employees. Id. at 158-59, 493 
P.2d at 996. 
[10] Although the construction process 
requires the general contractor to delegate 
to a greater or lesser degree to subcontrac-
tors, the general contractor remains re-
sponsible for successful completion of the 
entire project and of necessity retains the 
right to require that subcontractors per-
form according to specifications. The pow-
er to supervise or control the ultimate per-
formance of subcontractors satisfies the 
requirement that the general contractor re-
tain supervision or control over the subcon-
tractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v. 
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See gener-
ally Tanner Companies v. Superior 
Court, 144 Ariz. 141,146, 696 P.2d 693, 698 
(1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting). Therefore, 
as long as a subcontractor's work is a part 
or process of the general contractor's busi-
ness, an inference arises that the general 
contractor has retained supervision or con-
trol over the subcontractor sufficient to 
meet the requirement of § 35-1-42(2). See 
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 
Utah 309, 316, 172 P.2d 136, 140 (1946). 
Finally, we note that the remedial pur-
pose of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2) 
should be construed in favor of protecting 
the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction, 
678 P,2d at 307; Maryland Casualty Co. 
v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at 
225, 364 P.2d at 1022 (1961); Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 
187-88, 290 P.2d 692, 693-94 (1955). The 
Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an 
almost identical statutory provision, has 
stated that it "is a legislatively created 
scheme by which conceded nonemployees 
are deliberately brought within the cover-
age of the [Workmen's Compensation] 
Act" Young v. Environmental Air Prod-
ucts, Inc., 136 Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 
43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00. 
Wisconsin has also recognized the broad 
scope of its similar statute: 
The entire statutory scheme indicates a 
desire on the part of the legislature to 
extend the protection of these laws to 
those who might not be deemed employ-
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ees under the legal concepts governing Reversed as to Johnson Brothers and 
the liability of a master for the tortious remanded for further proceedings as to 
acts of his servant Matthews. 
Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord, 47 
Wis.2d 704, 715-16, 177 N.W.2d 904, 910 HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIM-
(1970) (footnote omitted). MERMAN, JJ„ concur. 
The Industrial Commission did not ad- HOWE, J., concurs in the result 
dress whether Bennett was a statutory em-
ployee of Matthews. We therefore remand /£*' fO | KEYmm* SYSTEM/ 
this case to the Commission for appropriate N T
 r AA v ruc-nr 
findings on that issue in light of the princi-
ples discussed above. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No, 86001236 
* 
ALLEN G. WHITE, * 
* 
* 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
JESS AYLETT dba * AND ORDER 
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION & DRYWALL * 
(UNINSURED), * 
* 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 9, 
1987, at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn 
W. Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant was represented by Attorneys Randall S. 
Feil and Mark Ward. 
The Uninsured Employers* Fund was represented by 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator. 
The issues to be decided in this case are as follows: 
1. The employment status of the applicant at the time of 
his industrial accident on March 17, 1986, i.e., was 
he a statutory employee of Jess Aylett, an employee of 
his brother, Steve White, or an independent contractor 
not subject to the benefits of the Workers* Compensa-
tion Act. 
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2. The applicants average weekly wage at the time of his 
injury. 
3. The time during which the applicant was temporarily 
totally disabled following his industrial accident. 
4. The extent of permanent partial impairment resulting 
from the applicant's industrial accident. 
There are no medical issues in this case requiring an impartial 
evaluation by a medical panel. The period of temporary total disability is 
relatively short. The treating physician has provided an impairment rating. 
Leave was given to the defendant to obtain an independent medical examination. 
Arrangements for such were made, but subsequently cancelled and there is no 
conflicting evidence before the Industrial Commission relative to the medical 
issues. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The time and manner in which the applicant's industrial accident 
occurred, and the resulting injuries, are not in dispute. The evidence shows 
that on March 17, 1986, the applicant sustained a serious injury to his left 
elbow while taping a garage. The garage ceiling was ten feet high and the 
applicant was working on three foot stilts in order to reach the ceiling. The 
stilts collapsed, causing the applicant to fall on the cement floor and he 
sustained a fracture dislocation of the elbow joint. 
2. Surgery was necessary and he was treated with open reduction and 
internal fixation. Now that his condition has stabilized, he has a range of 
motion of 30 to 90 degrees of flexion of his elbow and forty-five degrees of 
pronation and supination. He has tenderness in the ulnar groove and about the 
medial and lateral epicondyles of the elbow. He also has numbness in the 
distribution of his ulnar nerve involving one-half of the ring and little 
fingers of his hand. He has weakness of the intrinsic muscles, indicative of 
tardy ulnar palsy of the left side. His impairment of function and restric-
tion of motion has been rated by his treating physician as a 39% permanent 
partial impairment of the left upper extremity. 
3. The applicant and his brother, Steve White, commonly worked 
together as drywall applicators. At times, Steve White did business and bid 
on jobs in the name of White Drywall. White Drywall has a business license, 
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but the applicant does not. It was also the custom and practice of the appli-
cant and his brother, Steve, to split their earnings from jobs in which they 
worked together. 
4. The evidence is clear that the jobs worked on, by the applicant 
and his brother during the first quarter of 1986, were jobs contracted for by 
Jess Aylett Construction. Mr. Aylett contacted Steve White in December of 
1985, to see if he would be interested in working for him. He was then 
engaged in another job and was not immediately interested, but did make 
arrangements shortly thereafter to work for Mr. Aylett. In fairness to Mr. 
Aylett, the reference to "working for him" is not intended to mean as an 
employee. The applicant and his brother negotiated the price they were to be 
paid on work done for Aylett Construction. They were offered 9i a foot, but 
this was unacceptable and they finally agreed to work for 10^ a foot. The 
evidence is quite clear that the White brothers considered themselves 
^employees of Jess Aylett. On the other^ancT," Jess Aylett considered them as 
independent contractors^ There was not much said to clarify the relationship 
between them. The applicant and his brother testified that they requested 
separate checks be issued to them in payment for their services. Separate 
checks were periodically issued to them, but a recap of the checks shows that 
this did not constitute an equal division of earnings and accomplished little 
more than an accommodation to the White brothers. On their prior job, the 
White brothers had payroll taxes deducted from their gross earnings. On jobs 
done for Jess Aylett, they were paid the gross amount with no deductions^_ The 
White brothers were experienced drywall applicators requiring no direction or 
supervision in the performance of their work. They furnished their owo-iools, 
including some specialized rental equipment, and for all intents and purposes 
performed their work for Aylett Construction on a contract basis. In essence, 
the White brothers were working for wages on a piece basis, but their rela-
tionship to Jess Aylett would more accurately be described as that of a sub-
contractor. 
5. The applicant's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, 
and Jess Aylett's liability for payment of the same, does not depend on the 
applicant being an independent contractor or an employee, but rather on 
whether or not his work was that of a subcontractor engaged in the same trade 
or business as Jess Aylett Construction. This is in conformity with the 
holding in the recent case of Bennett v. Industrial Commission, filed 
September 30. 1986. In Bennett, the Supreme Court dealt with coverage under 
Section 35-1-42(2), which provides: 
"Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work 
he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the employer, such 
ArmFMriTTM c ; - ^ 
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contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all sub-
contractors under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
Section, employees of such original employer." 
The1court stated that: 
The requirement in Section 35-1-42(2) that the general 
contractor as a 'statutory employer' retain 'supervision or 
control' over the work of the subcontractor who hired the 
•statutory employee' cannot, by definition, be equated with 
the common law standard for determining whether a person is 
an employee or an independent contractor. In dealing with 
•statutory employees' the statute begins with the proposi-
tion that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the sub-
contractor. But the statutory requirement that the general 
contractor have 'supervision or control' over the work of 
the subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor must 
also qualify as an employee of the general contractor. 
That would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impos-
sible by definition. Rather, the general 'supervision or 
control' requires only that the general contractor retain 
ultimate control over the project. . . The power to super-
vise or control the ultimate performance of subcontractors 
satisfies the requirement that the general contractor 
retain supervision or control over the subcontractor. . . 
Therefore, as long as the subcontractor's work is a part or 
process of the general contractor's business, an inference 
arises that the general contractor has retained supervision 
or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the 
requirement of Section 35-1-42(2)." 
The court also explained that: 
"A subcontractor's work is 'part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer,' if it is part of the 
operations which directly relate to the successful perfor-
mance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise. 
The trade or business of a general contractor in the con-
struction business is construction, and any portion of the 
general contractor's construction project which is sub-
contracted out will ordinarily be considered 'part or 
process in the trade or business of the general 
contractor." (Citations omitted) 
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6. On many construction projects, there is a tier or several layers 
of contractors and subcontractors. A question logically arises as to how far 
up the ladder liability might extend in fixing liability on a statutory 
employer. It appears this question was answered by the recent decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Dennis Jacobsen v. Industrial Commission, 
filed June 15, 1987, in which the court referred to Arthur Larsen's Treatise 
on Workmens* Compensation and added additional commentary. The court stated: 
"[I]n the increasingly common situation displaying a 
hierarchy of principal contractors upon subcontractors upon 
subcontractors, if an employee of the lowest subcontractor 
on the totem pole is injured, there is no practical reason 
for reaching up the hierarchy any further than the first 
insured contractor." 1C A. Larson, Workmenfs Compensation 
Law. Section 49.14 (1986). 
Ring (the direct employer) has no means to pay bene-
fits to Pugh (the injured worker), but Jacobsen, (the first 
contractor) the party secondarily liable, has insurance 
coverage. If Jacobsen did not have sufficient funds or 
coverage, then "every" employer of Pugh would be unable to 
cover the liabilities for Pugh's benefits, as contemplated 
in Section 35-1-107(1) (1986). At that point, and not 
until that point, the Uninsured Employers* Fund would come 
into operation for the benefit of Pugh. In this case, it 
is not necessary for the Fund to pay benefits since 
Jacobsen and his insurer, the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah, are required to pay because Ring cannot. 
7. In the instant case, Jess Aylett argues that Steve White is 
liable to his brother, Allen, before any liability rests upon Aylett 
Construction. This argument is on the theory that Aylett Construction engaged 
Steve White, doing business as White Drywall, to do various jobs and that 
Allen White was employed by Steve White. Thus, Allen White is claimed to be 
an employee of Steve White and Aylett has no liability unless Steve White 
cannot pay. Under certain circumstances, this argument would be plausible. 
Jjunder the facts of this case, however, the argument is not plausible. Steve 
and Allen White were working together. As between them, this was a joint 
venture. They were both receiving the same amount of compensation for their 
labor and neither were bidding on the various jobs, as would be expected of a 
true contract. Allen White was not being paid by Steve White. Each were 
receiving checks in their own name from time to time and it was their agree-
ment that the earnings would be divided equally. Under these circumstances, 
the Administrative Law Judge cannot find an employee-employer relationship 
between Allen White and his brother Steve7J 
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8. It is difficult to compute the applicant's average weekly wage 
from the evidence submitted. Counsel for the defendant calculated the Whites' 
gross receipts during the period January 1, 1986, to March 21, 1986, at 
$9,218.65. This differs only a few dollars from the amount calculated by the 
Administrative Law Judge and is therefore an acceptable statement of gross 
receipts. Counsel for the defendant calculates a period of eighty days from 
January 1, 1986, to March 21, 1986. The Administrative Law Judge believes 
that January 1 and March 21 should be excluded from the calculation and that a 
period of seventy-eight days, or 11.14 weeks should be used in calculating the 
average weekly wage. 
9. Counsel for the defendants also argues that the gross receipts 
should be reduced by 20% to approximate the cost of tools and rental equipment 
used by the Whites. There is no evidence before the Industrial Commission 
reflecting the actual amount of such expense, but the applicant did indicate 
such expenses were incurred. Twenty percent seems unusually high. Without 
documented information as to the costs involved, the Administrative Law Judge 
will not allow a deduction of more than 5% for purposes of calculating the 
average weekly wage. If actual records or better estimates can be obtained 
reflecting a more accurate cost figure, the Administrative Law Judge will 
reserve the right to amend the award entered herein. A 5% reduction reduces 
the gross receipts to $8,757.72. Assuming half of this, or $4,378.86, was 
earned by the applicant, the calculated average weekly wage over this period 
of time amounts to $393.07. Based on this figure, the rate of compensation 
for temporary total disability is $262.00 per week, plus a $15.00 dependency 
allowance, or $277.00 per week. The rate of compensation for permanent 
partial impairment is the statutory maximum of $215.00 per week. 
10. The applicant testified he returned to work for a very few hours 
in June of 1986, and then was not able to work again until sometime in July. 
The statement of money earned, identified as Exhibit "A-3", shows the 
applicant did receive compensation for June in the amount of $24 7.28 and he 
received several checks for jobs done during the month of July. Without more 
specific information relative to an actual return to work date, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds July 1, 1986, to be the approximate date on 
which the applicant returned to work, ending the period of temporary total 
disability. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Applicant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result 
of his industrial accident of March 21, 1986, in accordance with the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jess Aylett, dba Jess Aylett 
Construction & Drywall, pay applicant compensation at the rate of $277.00 per 
week for 14.57 weeks, or a total of $4,035.89, this amount, plus interest at 
8% per annum from the date each payment would otherwise have been due and 
payable, shall be paid in a lump sum, less attorney's fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Jess Aylett, dba Jess 
Aylett Construction & Drywall, pay applicant compensation at the rate of 
$215.00 per week for 72.93 weeks, or a total of $15,6 79.95 for 39% permanent 
partial impairment of the applicant's left upper extremity. Interest on the 
award shall be payable at the rate of 8% per annum. These benefits are due 
and payable commencing July 1, 1986. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sherlynn W. Fenstermaker, attorney 
for the applicant, be paid the sum of $$3,700.00, the same to be deducted from 
the aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sums ion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
ygv day of September, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
J. Strartf&urg 
Commission /Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on September^1987, a copy of the attached Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Allen G, White 
12665 South Martinez Way 
Riverton, UT 84065 
Sherlynn W. Fenstermaker 
Attorney at Law 
42 North University, Suite 1 
Provo, UT 84601 
Jess Aylett Construction & Drywall 
11613 South High Mountain Drive 
Sandy, UT 84092 
Randall S. Feil 
Mark Ward 
Attorneys at Law 
P. 0. Box 45450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86001236 
ALLEN G. WHITE, 
Applicanty 
vs. 
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION & 
DRYWALL 
(UNINSURED) 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On September 9, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the 
above-captioned case followed by a Supplemental Order on December 9, 1987, and 
an Amended Supplemental Order on July IS, 1988. The three orders together 
awarded the applicant temporary total compensation, medical expenses and 
permanent partial impairment benefits (based on a medical panel rating of 30% 
whole person) for a work injury Which occurred on March 17, 1986. The Order 
concluded that the defendant, Jess Aylett Construction & Drywall, was the 
statutory employer of the applicant and thus was liable to pay the applicant 
the benefits awarded. The Administrative Law Judge based his conclusion that 
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall was the applicant's statutory employer on 
U. C. A. 35-1-42 (as it read in 1986) and on the Utah Supreme Court case, 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
On August 19, 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, the defendant, 
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall, filed a pro se Motion for Review 
renewing an earlier Motion for Review filed on October 8, 1987, by counsel for 
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall. That earlier filed Motion for Review 
addressed some issues that were later resolved by the Administrative Law 
Judge*s December 9, 1987 Supplemental Order and the July 15, 1988 Amended 
Supplemental Order. However, the Administrative Law Judge maintained 
consistently throughout the three orders that Jess Aylett Construction and 
Drywall was the applicants statutory employer and thus was liable for the 
benefits awarded, and Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall renews its 
objections to that finding in the most recent Motion for Review. 
The renewed Motion for Review contains a long list of objections 
which the Commission finds can be consolidated into two main Issues. The 
defendant first argues that Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall cannot be a 
statutory employer based on the Bennett rationale, because the Bennett case 
dealt with a general contractor's liability as a statutory employer and Jess 
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Aylett Construction and Drywall is not a general contractor, but rather only a 
subcontractor. This exact argument was not directly addressed in any of the 
Administrative Law Judge's three ox:ders, but the Administrative Law Judge does 
comment on this argument in his Summary of Testimony. The Administrative Law 
Judge states: 
••I think to interpret Bennett as setting forth two standards 
relative to a determination of statutory employment is 
almost absurd. It would make no sense at all to deny 
coverage to those working under a subcontractor, but award 
claims to those working under a subcontractor and a general 
contractor." 
The defendant's second main argument is that the primarily liable 
individual in this case is Steve White dba White Drywall. The defendant 
argues that the facts show that the applicant actually was working for his 
brother, Steve White, and thus, Steve White should be found to be the 
applicant's common law employer and primarily liable for the applicant's 
workers compensation claim. On this argument, the Administrative Law Judge 
states in his September 9, 1987 Order: 
"Under the facts of this case, however, the argument is not 
plausible. Steve and Allen White were working together. 
As between them, this was a joint venture. They were both 
receiving the same amount of compensation for their labor 
and neither were bidding on the various jobs, as would be 
expected of a true contract. Allen White was not being 
paid by Steve White. Each were receiving checks in their 
own name from time to time and it was their agreement that 
the earnings would be divided equally. Under these 
circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge cannot find an 
employee-employer relationship between Allen White and his 
brother, Steve." 
The Commission finds that the two issues discussed above are the 
issues to be resolved on review. The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact 
as stated by the Administrative Law Judge in his September 9, 1987 Order. 
With respect to the defendant's first main argument, the Commission agrees 
with the Administrative Law Judge*s interpretation of the holding in the 
Bennett case. Although in the Bennett case, the facts involved an injured 
employee attempting to recover benefits from the general contractor who 
subcontracted out to his employer, the Court in Bennett is interpreting the 
scope of the "statutory employer clause" in U. C. A. 35-1-42. That statute 
does not speak in terms of general contractors and subcontractors, but simply 
refers to those procuring work to be done by a contractor. Also, as the 
Administrative Law Judge points out, there is no logical reason to find that 
only those workers who can find a "general contractor" in the contract chain 
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are protected. Therefore, the Commission finds that the Bennett rationale 
(i. e. limited control is sufficient in order to find statutory employment) is 
applicable to any contractual relationship which would include the 
contractual relationship between the applicant and the defendant, Jess Aylett 
Construction and Drywall. 
With respect to the defendant's second argument regarding the 
applicant actually being employed by his brother, the Commission also agrees 
with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion. The applicant was paid by 
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall and not by his brother and the applicant 
shared the cost of renting equipment with his brother as opposed to his 
brother providing the tools. The facts show a partnership or joint venture 
and not employment. As such, the applicant had no common law employer which 
results in the statutory employer being liable for the benefits awarded. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Commission finds that the Administrative 
Law Judge correctly found Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall to be liable 
for the applicant's workers compensation benefits. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's August 19, 1988 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's September 9, 1987, 
December 9, 1987, and September 15, 1988 Orders are hereby affirmed and final 
with appeal to the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the final 
agency action as specified in U. C. A. 63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14 
and U. C. A. 35-1-86. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of CJtah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
ATTEST 
..day of February, 1989. 
j^*4<&<$<dwd&/rf 
Linda J. Stpasburg 
Commissioiy'secretary 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
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